

THE PART THAT HAS NO PART: ENJOYMENT, LAW, AND LOSS

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Like, pretend I am telling you about a woman who cut us.

Beth

1. Gamen like I'm telling you,

2. like I tell man story,

3. or I report that lady,

4. "Im been cut us."

5. I report im le,

6. I duno, Tjambitj

Beth: Pretend that I am telling you, or I tell a man, about an incident, or I turn in a lady by saying, "She cut us." I turn her in to, I don't know, Tjambitj.

It marked a certain rhythm in our long friendship, these morning conversations about the grammar and arts of Emiyenggal, a language once spoken by the inhabitants of a small estate on the northwest coast of Australia's Northern Territory, but now spoken as a first language by only a few older men and women. Ruby Yarrowin was considered the most knowledgeable, witty, and poetic of these Emi speakers. She was born

and raised in Emi country. This gave her linguistic practices an extra depth and truth, according to her cohort who considered linguistic ability and its truth-effects to be substantially related to country, a part of land as surely as soil and sand. Ruby and I had known each other for nine years when this conversation began. We had not begun serious discussions about the grammar and poetics of Emiyenggal until 1989. But from then on, these conversations stretched across concrete verandas in the community where she, her children and grandchildren, and her near and far cousins and siblings lived, and across the hunting and camping grounds that surrounded the community. On this day, Ruby and I were discussing verb classes, more specifically the verb class *-la*: things done in a slicing motion. What auxiliary verbs could be used with this verb class? What actions could be associated with such a motion? How did this verb class conjugate? *Ngala* (I-slicing motion),

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ngamala (you and I—slicing motion), *ngarrgala* (all of us—slicing motion), *bulan* (only us—slicing motion), *ganala* (you-slicing motion) . . .

Or this is one aspect of what we were doing. We were also—at times in our long conversations I thought primarily—enjoying something occasioned by discussions like this one that veered away from the regularity of grammar into scenes of desire, violence, loss, and the law. *I slice her neck; you slice her neck; all of us slice her neck. I turn her in; she turns me in, all of us turn her in.* We shared a disposition to this particular form of enjoyment, though she or I would take turns reminding each other that the ostensible purpose of our meetings was grammatical. And these moments of enjoyment seemed distinct from the pleasure (*plaisir*) we had uncovering some of Emi’s lawful regularity. Our enjoyment seemed closer to *jouissance*, the painful pleasure of exceeding a law in which we were implicated, an enjoyment of a desire (*desir*), in the mode of rage or grief, that is the cause and result of refusing to be disciplined by the body hanging from the gallows of the law. Indeed, I am fairly confident that Ruby Yarrowin and I cared at least as much about these moments of *jouissance* as about the pleasures of grammatical lawfulness. If I, or she, had cared more about the pleasure of linguistic combination and substitution, my linguistic archive would be less grammatically spotty, but our social bond would not have been as rich. And at a certain point in my academic career I had to decide which mattered more.

But the claim that Ruby Yarrowin and I “shared” an enjoyment that thickened into a bond of kinship or friendship and that this social bond can—or should—be described as queer raises two broad sets of questions that concern this essay. Both sets focus on the relationship between enjoyment (*jouissance*) and sociality and, more particularly, between enjoyment as a force that cannot be contained within a social order and two different kinds of sociality—the social bond that shared enjoyment creates and something we have come to think of as heteronormativity. And both sets of questions seek to understand the multiple kinds and modes of disruption, loss, and law implicated in the relationship between enjoyment and heteronormativity, especially when heteronormativity is displaced within the sociality of settler colonialism.

On the one hand are questions that accumulate around shared *jouissance* and the kind of social bond it creates. Leaving aside the particularities of Ruby Yarrowin’s and my friendship, can any two people share enjoyment—or do they merely share a disposition toward enjoyment? In other words, is enjoyment some *thing* or *dynamic* that can be said to be shareable and, thus, able to create, if at the most incipient level, a social bond? Or can one only share a disposition (drive, or *trieb*) toward enjoyment (*jouissance*)? In either case, what kind of social bond

1 is this enjoyment or disposition toward enjoyment making when the thing about
 2 *jouissance* is that it undermines all normative orderings of the social? After all,
 3 what supposedly makes enjoyment a factor in politics, at least for Slavoj Žižek, is
 4 its nonrelationship to all normative social orderings. If *jouissance* is an “obscene
 5 enjoyment” of the gallows erected by the Law, then what part can the part that
 6 will have no part in the social contract—yet sets the conditions of that social
 7 contract and its own divergence—play in creating a social bond?¹ Clearly, if a
 8 social bond emerges in these conditions, it must be a queer sort of social bond,
 9 one that is the effect of the disruption of the given time of the social contract
 10 (heteronormativity) yet creates at a secondary level a new social ordering (queer
 11 sociality). If some mutual recognition, as Ruby Yarrowin and I had, emerges at the
 12 point where enjoyment meets the gallows of the law, then what kind of mutuality is
 13 this *mutual* recognition? Should this mutual recognition be called queer kinship,
 14 friendship, or intimacy, or should we leave a hole in the space of representation for
 15 this nonrepresentational relation? What violence is done to the specific histories
 16 Ruby Yarrowin is narrating when we begin or end by metanarrating them as queer
 17 histories? What violence is done if we do not?

18 On the other hand are questions about the difference between this kind of
 19 (queer) social bond and other forms of sociality and law—between a sociality cre-
 20 ated in these moments of enjoyment and a sociality whose sources are elsewhere.
 21 Perhaps the first thing to note, as the long history of postcolonial and subaltern
 22 theory has demonstrated, is that the social is not a unitary phenomenon (whether
 23 one considers the social or law from a symbolic or pragmatic perspective), nor is
 24 it an unorganized phenomenon. Every aspect of social life is multiply partly orga-
 25 nized and thus multiply partly disorganized, and differentially so. There are many
 26 examples one can use to make this point. One example relevant here is the rela-
 27 tionship between heteronormativity and the divisions of settler normativity: what
 28 I have elsewhere called the late liberal division of the autological subject (and
 29 the intimate event) and genealogical society (kinship).² In settler colonies such as
 30 Australia, settler normativity is not external to heteronormativity, but neither is it
 31 purely a projection of heteronormativity. The organization of sociality on the basis
 32 of the naturalness of a civilizational displacement (settler normativity) constantly
 33 leans on heteronormativity as the organization of sociality based on the natural-
 34 ness of gendered binaries, as this essay demonstrates. But heteronormativity also
 35 constantly has its ascendancy in a civilizational displacement, as has been evident
 36 in debates on gay marriage. And this difference between a relationship and coex-
 37 tensiveness contains a potential space for new forms of life and political thought.
 38 Moreover, because both heteronormativity and settler normativity characterize

rather than contain the actualities of a lifeworld, they also create and contain the conditions for divergent forms of life and political thought.

Indeed, since the mid-1960s, immanent critique has sought to conceptualize the source and space of “new possibilities of life” independent of philosophical notions of transcendental consciousness.³ In his Vincennes lectures on Spinoza, Gilles Deleuze, for instance, slowly differentiated between a mode of thought defined by its representational character (ideas) and a mode of thought that is not defined representationally (affects).⁴ Deleuze concedes that affects can have an ideational form (“there is an idea of the loved thing, to be sure, there is an idea of something hoped for”) and that ideas have a chronological and logical primacy in relation to the affects (“In order to will it’s necessary to have an idea, however confused or indeterminate it may be, of what is willed”). But he insists that affects like hope and love “represent nothing, strictly nothing.”⁵ Affects may be ultimately determined by the given system of ideas that one has, but they are not “reducible to the ideas one has” whether one considers these ideas in their objective extrinsic reality or in their formal intrinsic reality.⁶ Ideas and affects are “two kinds of modes of thought” that differ “in nature.” An idea represents something, while an affect does not. An affect is not nothing, but it is also not something in the same way as an extrinsic or intrinsic idea. An affect is a force of existing (*vis existendi*) that is neither the realized thing (an idea) nor the accomplishment of a thing (an act, *potentia agendi*). This perspective on the force of existing is clearly engaging Spinoza’s claim that things, finite and determinate kinds of existence, strive (*conatus*) to persevere in their being. For Deleuze, the perpetual variation between striving to persevere and any actual idea or action that emerges from this striving provides a space of potentiality where new forms of life can emerge.

But in a similar way that two people may, or may not, share a disposition toward enjoyment as *jouissance*, so two people may or may not share a disposition towards these spaces of immanent possibility. They might, as Ruby Yarrowin and I sometimes did, enjoy the space of immanent social unmooring, of becoming otherwise, of growing a new body. But they might not and might attempt to flee these intensified spaces of immanent becoming for any of a variety of reasons. But even when they do not flee, even when they turn toward the body becoming otherwise, in what sense is the unmooring they experience *shared*—in what sense is it mutual? Becoming otherwise is certainly generally available, irrespective of the fact that only some people make use of this potential. But the general availability of intensified potential, like the general availability of enjoyment, doesn’t negate that potentiality and enjoyment are never outside specific social orderings even if they cannot be contained within any particular social ordering. Every moment

1 of enjoyment emerges from the specific and differential way that a social order
 2 apprehends bodies and subjects. Enjoyment is separable from the social order
 3 only from an analytic point of view — which does not mean that it is the same as
 4 the social order. Likewise with potentiality and actuality. The differential spacings
 5 that are enjoyment and potentiality emerge within specific social orderings. And
 6 these differential spacings return us to the question of what to call the social bond
 7 Ruby Yarrowin and I experienced, or, for that matter, the social bonds that exist
 8 between her children and grandchildren and me as we try to migrate her conversa-
 9 tions into a new media project.

10 What, for instance, is the relationship between the demands imposed on
 11 my reading of this conversation for this special issue of *GLQ* devoted to queer soci-
 12 alities and the demands imposed on Ruby Yarrowin, her children, and her grand-
 13 children, as they produce, translate, and circulate these conversations across the
 14 given orderings of settler normativity? Is “queer” as an “idea” a sign, an empty
 15 signifier, or an affect able to detach itself from its own histories of becoming and
 16 become a general category? What forms of obligation, loss, and enjoyment does
 17 this migration to the general entail? What kinds, or modes, of corporeality and
 18 loss pertain to each?

19

20

21 **Or pretend I am reporting her to a representative of the Law.**

22 Ruby

23 7. “yuwa-nga-nenayi

24 8. kala-ngaing-gurr-ayi

25 9. yuwanga-neni kaaanan-yuwanga.”

26 10. you tellimim now that man.

27 Beth

28 11. no more just me

29 12. im been cut us.

30 13. Im im me,

31 14. I been go Tjaimbitj,

32 15. like “yuwa-nga kala . . .”

33 16. ha, I don’t know what I say

34 17. “kala-gurr”?

35 18. no more le

36 Ruby: “There, from her, she cut me,

37 there from her, she’s standing over there,”

38 you tell that man.

If Ruby Yarrowin and I were to report this woman to the law, what it would make of her crime is a matter of social timings and spacings within law. It would depend not on our ability to abstract the gallows of the law from the immanent order of the social but on our ability to situate them more firmly within the immanent ordering of the social. In 1993, when this conversation was being recorded, Australia was still broadly committed to a liberal politics of Indigenous cultural recognition. Indigenous traditional culture was perceived within the broad framework of worth rather

Beth: No, not just me, she cut us, her and her and me. I went to Tjaimbitj and said something like, “there her, she slice . . .” Ha, I don’t know what I’d say, “kalgurr”? (third person “-la” verb class plus first person direct object pronoun with the auxiliary verb “gurr”). No, not that.

other cultures “survive” but “acknowledg[ing] their *worth*.”⁷ While he maintained that “there is something valid” in the presumption of worth,” Taylor noted that “the presumption is by no means unproblematic, and involves something like an act of faith” (66). In the Australian case, this act of faith had two faces. On the one hand, much of the nation was committed to the idea that Indigenous traditional culture, having “animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time,” had “something important to say to all human beings,” and, on the other hand, much of the nation believed that recognizing the worth of what traditional Indigenous people had to say would heal a nation divided by its violent colonial history (66). And so, if Taylor was right that recognition avoids the real damage, distortion, and harm that occur if one group of people “mirror[s] back” to another “a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves,” the identity in need of protection was not, or not merely, Indigenous (subaltern or minority) (25). It was liberal nationalism.

Within this framework Ruby was an exemplary subject for national redemption. She had all the stereotypical indexes of the traditional. Her life spanned a vicious period of settler violence in the north, an early sexualization of Indigenous cultural practices and beliefs, and the politics of recognition that spiritualized Indigenous cultural practices and beliefs. She was born and raised in the bush but then forcibly interned on various government settlements. Her father was a well-known traditional singer who was arrested for practicing a ritual that the police considered mere cover for gang rape, but who can now be heard on any number of commercially available CDs. Her two brothers died in their early twenties from treatable respiratory conditions—or from poison, depending on your source. She herself was arrested for burying one of her infants in the bush after it had died of pneumonia. But in the modern land rights era, marked by the passage of the Aboriginal Land Rights Act (1976), her second husband was a critical leader of a local land claim before he died of a stroke in his early fifties. And she participated in a land claim over her own country before she passed away at the beginning of

than aversion or mere tolerance. Charles Taylor outlined the difference between the recognition of worth of others and the mere tolerance of the other in an influential essay published one year after this recording was made. In the “Politics of Recognition,” Taylor noted the challenge of not merely letting

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1 2007. The very rituals that were once condemned as mere veneer for sexual vio-
 2 lence were now celebrated as a sign of Indigenous difference (as long as they were
 3 not practiced).

4

5 Ruby

6 19. hahahaha

7 20. “kala-ngaing-gurr-ayi”

8 21. one way.

9 Beth

10 22. im been cut us?

11 23. Ok

12 Ruby: hahaha. “kala-ngaing-gurr-ayi”
 13 (third person “-la” verb class plus first
 14 person direct object pronoun with the
 15 auxiliary verb “gurr.”) Just like that.

16 Beth: [And what about] she cut us? Ok
 17 [never mind]

18

19 experienced as its own. The semantic richness of this other world garnered new
 20 intensified interest. And insofar as it could accumulate symbolic capital, life expe-
 21 riences such as hers became a space for accumulating economic values. What
 22 Ruby and I were doing—what we called “language-language” marking the meta-
 23 linguistic nature of our endeavor—as well as being something we both enjoyed,
 24 was a job for which I paid Ruby when I had money. To be sure, I was not a linguist
 25 by training. Nor was Ruby always amenable to the deadening nature of grammati-
 26 cal iteration that other visiting linguists demanded. As a result our conversations
 27 often meandered into domains that were more or less off-topic. But the space for
 28 these conversations was opened, at least partly, by the politics of recognition. Our
 29 enjoyment was supported legally and celebrated nationally. It was declared to play
 30 a central part in the constitution of the common world. But it was a very specific
 31 and regulated part. The traditional had to be regulated by an ancient lost law; the
 32 Indigenous people had to be regulated by this imagery of the traditional in order
 33 to have access to state goods.

34 I returned to this taped conversation in 2007 as part of an augmented
 35 reality project that Ruby’s children and grandchildren had asked me to help them
 36 create. To get a sense of what we were trying to do, imagine a tourist preparing for
 37 a trip to far north Australia. While researching the area online, she discovers our
 38 Web site, Karrabing, that highlights various points of interest. She then downloads

In the 1990s experiences and mem-
 ories like hers were able to accumu-
 late two kinds of value. They were a
 source of symbolic capital deployed
 for the mending of a national frac-
 ture. In the framework of liberal
 recognition, knowing Ruby, or the
 lifeworld that she embodied and
 represented—and this distinc-
 tion between Ruby and lifeworld
 is important—would provide the
 nation a redemptive way of knowing
 itself. Her history of settler abuse
 and cultural recognition could be

either a free or premium version of a GPS tour into her smartphone. Now imagine this same person in a boat, floating off the shore of a beach in remote Anson Bay. She activates her GPS and video camera and holds up her smartphone. As she moves the phone around she see various hypertexts and video options available to her—a story of the Indigenous Dreaming site where she finds herself, archival photos of traditional uses of that area. Suddenly the land is speaking its history and culture without any long-term material impact on the landscape. Ruby’s descendants, whom I had by then known for twenty-three years (which was for some of them their entire lives), hoped to use parts of the recordings that I had made with Ruby Yarrowin as the basis of a pilot program. If the context of the recording of this conversation was the putative celebration of traditional Indigenous culture within a liberal politics of recognition, the context of my transcription and migration of it into a new media format was very different.

To understand how dramatically the national attitude toward Indigenous traditional culture had changed between 1993 and 2007, we can simply ask why my friends wanted to create this pilot program. By January 2007 Ruby Yarrowin had passed away, one of the last senior persons of her community. Like other rural Indigenous communities, hers was characterized by a deeply skewed age distribution with a median age of twenty-one, compared with thirty-seven for the non-Indigenous population, and an average life expectancy of fifty-nine for men and sixty-five for women, compared with seventy-seven and eighty-two for non-Indigenous men and women, respectively. And like other rural communities, hers was marked by increasing substance abuse among younger members and increasing violence associated with it. As reported in the local Darwin newspaper, on March 15, 2007, many of Ruby Yarrowin’s children and grandchildren were threatened by other members of the community with chainsaws and pipes, and watched their cars and houses torched, and their dogs beaten to death. Four large extended families whose households were headed by Ruby Yarrowin’s children or grandchildren were driven out of the community. These families lost rare, well-paying jobs in education, housing, and water works. Why they were driven out—what caused this explosion of violence—is a question that cannot be answered, except in the most narrow sense (so-and-so hit so-and-so and then their friends got involved), without immediately being drawn into discourses of culture and law. For instance, follow-up news stories insinuated that traditional land struggles were to blame for the riot, that traditional owners drove off families whose traditional lands lay farther south. These newspaper articles did not report that Ruby Yarrowin, and most of the senior and now-deceased members of the

1 community, had continually petitioned the Land Commission and the Northern
 2 Land Council to recognize all community members as traditional owners under
 3 the Aboriginal Land Rights Act irrespective of their clan affiliations to avoid cre-
 4 ating internal divisions and the violence they feared would flow from them.⁸ Nei-
 5 ther the land commissioner nor the land council agreed. Instead they divided the
 6 community according to the colonial law of clan affiliation projected as the truth
 7 of local traditional culture—overriding the desire of local people to be governed
 8 otherwise. If they wished to have state goods, they had to accede to the fantasy
 9 of the ancient law. The genealogical imaginary that helped shape the riot was
 10 then used to try to rectify the harms of the riot. Soon after the riot, public meet-
 11 ings were held, attended by bureaucrats in the Northern Territory’s Department
 12 of Family, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs, in which the
 13 displaced people were held up as examples of the failures of land rights policies to
 14 protect Indigenous people living in communities outside their traditional country.
 15 The families driven out were promised new housing, schooling, and jobs at Bulgul,
 16 a site closer to their traditional countries. Fifty people promptly moved to Bulgul
 17 and set up a tent settlement. The augmented reality project was conceived in this
 18 space of displacement, a virtual library and archive, for a set of virtual lives.

19
 20 **Like the sorry way birds cry when someone dies.**

21
 22 Ruby

23 24. awa kurr-werh

24 25. kumen-gurr-biya

25 Beth

26 26. ble head?

27 27. no mama,

28 28. sorry way im been sing out,

29 29. people where they die

30 Ruby: That Kurrwer bird, it cries.

31 Beth: On its head (verb class “-men”

32 with the auxiliary verb “gurr” and the

33 Batjema term of head-piya)?

34 Ruby: No mama, (combining this verb

35 class and auxiliary verb, this means) the

36 sorry way it sings out when people die.

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But the act of faith on which the politics of cultural recognition had been based was shattered when, three months after my friends moved to Bulgul, on the eve of a federal election, John Howard’s conservative Liberal government declared an emergency intervention in Indigenous affairs in the Northern Territory. “The intervention” became shorthand for a set of policies that his government put in place in the wake of the *Little Children Are Sacred* report of the Northern Territory Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal

Children from Sexual Abuse. The *Little Children Are Sacred* report, commissioned by the Northern Territory Labor government and publicly released on June 15, 2007, begins by dramatically noting “a breakdown of Aboriginal culture” caused by a number of underlying conditions of Indigenous life. “Excessive consumption of alcohol is variously described as the cause or result of poverty, unemployment, lack of education, boredom and overcrowded and inadequate housing. The use of other drugs and petrol sniffing can be added to these. Together, the authors argued, they lead to excessive violence. In the worst case scenario it leads to sexual abuse of children.”⁹ The *Little Children Are Sacred* report was careful to dispel five myths about Indigenous sexual abuse (Aboriginal men are the only offenders; Aboriginal law is the reason for high levels of sexual abuse; Aboriginal law is used as an excuse to justify abuse; Aboriginal culture is the reason for underreporting; and Aboriginal men do not have an important role to play in preventing child sexual abuse). Yet it was in terms of such myths about the cause of Aboriginal sexual abuse that federal government spokespersons and the national media made sense of the abuse. When the report circulated in the national press, the point that received most attention was not the supposed breakdown of Indigenous culture but the abuse of children by their family based on traditional marriage laws.¹⁰

Beth

30. Ok,

31. What about “gave him”?

Ruby

32. Nyene-wut-ayi bargarwi.

33. Bargarwi nyene-wut-ayi.

34. I am just pretending,

35. I love that [is] bargarwi.

36. Kanan-wut-ayi.

Beth

37. I love him.

Ruby: her and her and me. I went to Tjaimbitj and said something like, “there her, she slice . . .” Ha, I don’t know what I’d say, third person “-la” verb class with the auxiliary verb “gurr,” no, not that.

By September the Howard government passed the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act (2007). The act gave the federal government sweeping powers over Indigenous land tenure, welfare, alcohol consumption, and education.¹¹ Throughout the Northern Territory large bright blue or yellow signs were erected at the entrance of Indigenous communities announcing that pornography and alcohol were banned and in the process publicly branding Indigenous communities as spaces of perversion and decay. **The era of cultural recognition and reconcilia-**

1 tion was over, Howard declared. The governance of liberal recognition would
2 no longer extend to Australia's Indigenous inhabitants, and the sexual dysfunc-
3 tion at their center, and the sooner the inhabitants of Australia accepted this,
4 the sooner the harms of the past could be extinguished. The federal government
5 would, forcibly if necessary, puncture the sovereignty of Indigenous communi-
6 ties and liberate countless Indigenous children who were languishing in rural
7 communities—worse, being raped in these sealed-off spaces, their abuse aided
8 and abetted by childless advocates kowtowing to the sanctity of a perverse tra-
9 ditional law and refusing to accept the irrelevance of customary sexuality and
10 gender to modern life. Traditional Indigenous law would no longer have any part
11 in the common world, no matter that the traditional Aboriginal law was a product
12 of the common world of settler colonialism. Indigenous people living in remote
13 communities, or those like my friends who were promised housing in or nearer to
14 their traditional country, were told to move closer to the cities where infrastruc-
15 tural and service delivery costs were lower, even if doing so would endanger their
16 lives. The people who made the promises to the displaced persons confronted
17 the budgetary consequences of these promises and suddenly became difficult
18 to reach.

19 On November 26 of the same year, the Howard government was soundly
20 defeated in federal elections. On February 21, 2008, Kevin Rudd, the new Labor
21 prime minister, made a national apology to Indigenous people, who represented,
22 he said, the “oldest continuing cultures in human history.” His apology, an act
23 the previous Howard government had steadfastly refused, was said to be for past
24 governments' mistreatment of Indigenous people, with particular reference to the
25 Stolen Generations, the practice of removing Indigenous children from their fami-
26 lies, which continued into the 1970s. Rudd claimed that “righting the wrongs of
27 the past” would allow Australia to move “forward with confidence to the future.”
28 And, in almost the same breath, Rudd promised a renewed commitment to the
29 policies and rhetoric of the intervention described as “new solutions to endur-
30 ing problems.”¹² But these solutions would never be in the present. The Howard
31 government acknowledged this—that life in the present would be worse for many
32 Indigenous men and women. The current Rudd government has agreed, saying it
33 would remain unclear for some time how the intervention would impact Indigenous
34 lives—whether it will have made any positive difference in basic service delivery,
35 housing, health, or education.

36 Like a nightmare that lingers past dawn, the sexualization of Indigenous
37 life worlds has continued fairly unabated. Given the centrality of the “intimate
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event” in the liberal diaspora, it is unsurprising that its spectral violation was an
inexhaustible, and unassailable, tool for those advocating a neoliberal solution
to settler governance. As I have argued elsewhere, the intimate event constitutes
three modes of truth about the subjects of empire: the truth of intimacy’s proper
domain, the truth of its normative ideals, and the truth of contrasting evils.¹³ In
the southern winter of 2009, Peter Sutton, a linguist and anthropologist, published
The Politics of Suffering: Indigenous Australia and the End of the Liberal Consensus.
The book was promoted by conservative pundits like Christopher Pearson of
the *Australian* and Noel Pearson of the Cape York Institute for Policy and Leadership.¹⁴
In it Sutton argues that policymakers and academics should focus on Indigenous
social traditions as the primary source of Indigenous social dysfunction. Forget
problems of structural racism and state neglect; the central cause of Indigenous
impoverishment, ill health, and educational stagnation was Indigenous people’s
“ancient need to pursue family loyalties over essentially foreign ideologies such as
the doctrine of the common good” and to cling to “traditional medical beliefs and
practices” that blocked “certain preventative and curative health measures.”¹⁵
Indigenous Australians must walk out of their communities, leaving their ancient
ways behind. Sutton seems sure where they are going: modernity, where the common
good prevails rather than sexual abuse, family loyalties, and strange beliefs about
bodies—the exact kind of body that Ruby and my linguistic exercises were conjuring.
But in Sutton’s book we see how the division of autological subject and genealogical
society is conserved rather than overthrown, even as the values of one side of this
division—the genealogical society—are reversed and ruthlessly recalibrated. Sutton—
who has argued that an absolute distinction needs to be made between traditional
Aboriginal people and mere historical Aboriginal people, the former given special
rights and values based on their determination by customary law—upholds this
division even as he reverses the value of the customary. What does not change,
what maintains its singular and superior value across the politics of recognition
and intervention, is the autological subject, that phantasmic, self-authorizing,
future-oriented subject.

1 Beth
 2 47. That my boyfriend now.
 3 Ruby
 4 48. Handji handji
 5 49. that hankchief bla, yeh
 6 50. gamen, you, an-nyene-wut,
 7 51. nyene-wut-ayi
 8 Beth
 9 52. No, but little story,
 10 53. "I been give im,"
 11 54. no more love im,
 12 55. like "I been give im pen."
 13 Ruby
 14 56. munggarra raitje karra.
 15 57. Munggarra raitje (sex with the hands)
 16 theni (directional marker).
 17 58. karra-theni-yuwa
 18 Beth: So that's my boyfriend afterwards?
 19 Ruby: hand, hand, that handkerchief is
 20 for, yeh. Pretend, you, he "gives"
 21 Beth: No, but what about a short sentence,
 22 "I gave him" not "love him" like "I gave
 23 him"
 24 Beth: No, but what about a short sentence,
 25 "I gave him" not "love him" like "I gave
 26 him"
 27 Ruby: Slippery fluid associated with
 28 loving done with hands (you also use) the
 29 directional "-theni."
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 31 the case that within the liberal diaspora, the part that cannot have a part is always
 32 stained by sexual perversion, are there other worlds, potential worlds within lib-
 33 eral worlds, in which this was not the case? Would any of these reasons and our
 34 responses to them lead to someone or something being reported to a representative
 35 of the law? Which law?
 36 When deciding that certain parts can or cannot have a part in what we
 37 are making, we are not merely avoiding the current sexual stain of culture. They,
 38

When Ruby's children and grand-children, her nieces and nephews, and I sat down to talk about the augmented reality project, we faced the question of obligation and allegiance within a division of the social in which we were differentially constituted and implicated. In selecting various platforms for the new media project, the divisions and unities that would create the content of its "archive" (the XML file), and the interactional protocols designed into the user interface, we would indicate our ethical and practical evaluation of the viability of Ruby's knowledge, beliefs, and practices in the present world. What part of Ruby Yarrowin's life and words can be a part of the augmented reality project without, on the one hand, forcing her children and grandchildren to play the part of the defiled traditional subject and, on the other, excluding them from the goods that the part of the traditional subject still affords? What part would have no part and for what reasons? If it is

like me, are also making a guess about where the pendulum that swung between 1
the sexualization and spiritualization of Indigenous lifeworlds would be when we 2
started and when we stopped our project. And this metaphor of a pendulum isn't 3
sufficient. The law doesn't merely swing. It is composed of multiple and incom- 4
mensurate forms, parts, spacings, and coverages. Here it is important to note 5
that neither the politics of recognition nor the politics of intervention exists fully 6
or singularly. Even during the heyday of cultural recognition, social programs 7
were underfunded and sporadically funded. Certain laws could be celebrated as 8
long as they were not practiced. Certain groups had access to the power-laden 9
spaces of Indigenous bureaucracies, others didn't. We see the same sporadic, 10
underfunded, and misfunded dynamic in the politics of intervention.¹⁶ The pas- 11
sage of the Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act did not over- 12
turn all previous legislation pertaining to Indigenous Australians. Legislative, 13
bureaucratic, and regulatory regimes continue to demand the presentation of a 14
traditional Indigenous culture that at the same time is criminalized by the legis- 15
lative, bureaucratic, and regulatory regimes being put in place. The intervention 16
is merely—and only partly—inverting the relationship between the division of 17
the autological subject and genealogical society we witnessed in the heyday of 18
liberal recognition.¹⁷ Every part and no part might at any moment have a part to 19
play in regulating Indigenous lifeworlds. 20

But even as Ruby Yarrowin's living relatives and I are making a guess 21
about, and strategically maneuvering across, the multiple and partial organiza- 22
tions of social life, they and I are divided by these multiple and partial orderings 23
of social life. I may have known them since they were born or were young adoles- 24
cents, and we might share a history and disposition to maintaining the lifeworld 25
of Ruby Yarrowin, but we cannot share this history and disposition outside the 26
displacements of settler normativity. And our inability to share this history and 27
disposition is not so different than what Ruby Yarrowin and I could do. Ruby Yar- 28
rowin and I might have shared an enjoyment of the disrupted social contract, but 29
our location within that social contract was not shared. If they and I were brought 30
before the law, the law would treat us differently, irrespective of whatever social 31
bonds existed between Ruby Yarrowin, her children and grandchildren, and me. 32
And this different treatment wouldn't simply be divided—they on one side and 33
I on the other. The side that apprehends me, the autological, maintains its value 34
even as it continually flips the values of the other side, the genealogical. In other 35
words, because the division of the autological subject and genealogical society is 36
not about differences in the world but about a differential spacing of the world, 37
our enjoyment is as divided by these displacements as our social bond is made 38
through them. Our social bond is a willingness to reside at the immanent nowhere

1 of being within and beyond these multiple, partial, and distributed divisions. We
 2 meet where we are divided. But we are divided in a way that we can never meet.

3

4

5 **If you want me or the story.**

6 Beth

7 59. karra-theni (third person singular,
 8 doing things with hands)

9 Ruby

10 60. karra-nyain-

11 61. that karra-na

12 62. im lover now.

13 63. Im love

14 64. gamen im happy that man.

15 65. raitje that mean.

16 66. What you tired, mom?

17 Beth

18 67. Hmmm, what, like I give im pirriwi

19 Ruby

20 68. pirriwi ngi-ngena-wut-ayi

21 Beth

22 69. I been givim axe?

23 Ruby

24 70. yes gaiya-ngaini-gaiyi . . .

25 71. well ngiyi-wut-ayi

26 Beth: done with hands with “them”?

27 Ruby: (Yes) use the verb class *-rra* (thing
 28 done with hands) and the direct object pro-
 29 nouns, she’s his lover now. He loves. Like,
 30 he’s satisfied. Raitje means satisfied. Are
 31 you tired, mom?

32 Beth: Hmm, is this the same verb forms I’d
 33 use for “I give him an axe”?

34 Ruby: “I gave him an axe.”

35 Beth: “I *gave* him an axe”?

36 Ruby: Yes, “he gave him, (use the verb
 37 class *-yi*, things done while lying down)
 38 he lying down,” well really, “I lying down
 gave . . .”

In critical ways, queer theory, since its inception, has anticipated the strange mode of social bonding I am describing. Scholars, such as Gayle Rubin and Michael Warner, and activist movements, such as Sex Panic and the Gay Shame Collective, have shown the kinds of political work that sex panics do.¹⁸ Summarizing this literature, Bruce Burgett has recently written, “One of the benefits of the panic hypothesis is that it extends this more radical project by naming mass-mediated sex panics—‘white slavery,’ ‘anti-homosexuality,’ and ‘child pornography’ are among Rubin’s examples—as the sites where sex and sexuality are assembled as instrumentalities of power.”¹⁹ We might also repeat a point that Rubin makes, namely, that sex panics articulate diverse forms of sexuality into singular though encompassing zones of discipline—à la Laclau, moral sex panics create a centering effect even as they create new political antagonisms. And these antagonisms refer to, and are experienced as if in, the body, creating spirals of bodily anxiety. The antidote, according to such activist groups as Gay

Shame and Sex Panic, is to challenge power by radically rejecting sexual shame. 1
A queer response to the intervention might be: Be not ashamed! Fuck it. Screw 2
it. In the same way Ruby Yarrowin and I enjoyed these scenes of excess beyond 3
pleasure, her children and I should enjoy ourselves as symptom—as pure enjoy- 4
ment—within the failed politics of liberal recognition. Rather than argue that 5
the political public is lying, refuse to assimilate, claim the perverse sexualiza- 6
tion of Indigenous culture. Live with others outside the charmed circle of sexual 7
normativity. 8

In some way this is what Ruby Yarrowin was inviting me to do. There is, 9
after all, some relation between the enjoyment that Ruby and I shared and the 10
enjoyment advocated by those who celebrate existence outside the charmed circle 11
of sexual normativity. This becomes especially clear if we understand our linguis- 12
tic exercises as *askesis* rather than semantics. When understood as *askesis*, an 13
exercise of the self rather than a decoding of meaning, the linguistic exercises that 14
seem to have the least to do with sexuality and sexual histories, meanings, and 15
identities (what after all does the conjugation of *-la* have to do with sexuality?) 16
are revealed to have the most to do with them. But perhaps *-la* has everything 17
to do with life outside the sociality of settler colonialism insofar as it is part of 18
a creation of a new background of bodies, life, animacies, and destinies. In this 19
restructured background sexuality would itself be reorganized, dehumanized by 20
a more active animate landscape. In other words, conversations like ours are the 21
practices of the self that build the background that in turn creates an ease of 22
unreflective action in the associations of desire and the uses of ethical substance. 23
These conversations provide a dexterity of being that emerges from daily practices 24
of mouth, eye, and ear that trace and retrace the movements of meaning, script, 25
and sensory embodiment. And in relating these substances, memories, and dispo- 26
sitions, they create practices of caring for and being obligated to each other and 27
the world in a new way. 28

If this is so, then the purpose of these linguistic exercises was not to dis- 29
cover knowledge and truth, not to find a sexual identity or practice, though these 30
are not excluded from the exercise. The conversations were about the conditions 31
of care and obligation that emerge when the world is knitted together and ani- 32
mated in a specific way. As one topic leads to another, as the topic of revenge 33
leads to the signs of grief, a background of being opens, and in this opening 34
the substantial nature of a new ethical system begins to glimmer on the horizon 35
connecting human and nonhuman grief and recognition, say *the sorry way that* 36
birds cry when people die. It is in this way that the grammar of Emi as a prac- 37
tice or exercise of the self allows a new association—*assemblage*—of material 38

1 to emerge as ethically sensible. The movement of verbal categories such as *-la*
 2 (things done in a slicing motion) are associated and differentiated from other ver-
 3 bal categories such as the verbal category *-rra* (things we do with our hands):
 4 say *ngarra-du*, digging holes, feeling inside a sliced stingray for fat, or playing
 5 with women. All of these exercises create a new body in which desire dwells.

6

7 Beth

8 72. my brain

9 73. I'm tired now mama

10

11 Ruby

12 73. mama leave im now

13 74. please can't you have a rest.

14 75. I'm not tired.

15 76. I'm happy.

16 77. You have a rest.

17 78. Tomorrow now we talk talk.

18 Beth

19 79. tomorrow story.

20 80. like that man

21 81. where man

22 82. where im like olden time story

23 83. tomorrow

24 Ruby

25 84. yes if you want me or story

26 Beth: My brain — I am tired now mom.

27 Ruby: Mom, lets stop for now. Please can't

28 you have a rest? I'm not tired. I'm happy.

29 You have a rest. We can talk tomorrow.

30 Beth: Tomorrow we can concentrate on sto-

31 ries. Like the story

32 about the man, where that man,

33 where — like olden time stories —

34 tomorrow.

35 Ruby: Yes, if you want me or the story.

36

37

38

But Ruby Yarrowin's and my con-
 versation did not end with this
 new body. It ended with exhaus-
 tion and uncertainty. And both
 of these endings place pressure
 on the obligations of queer theory
 and queer social bonds as these
 "queer" bonds extend into other
 worlds of care and obligation. To
 end at the point at which we find
 what we are looking for — a new
 body emerging at the interstices of
 enjoyment and law, of actual and
 potential social orders — might
 be sufficient for the purpose of
 an academic inquiry into queer
 social bonds, but it seems at once
 too purposeful and at the same
 time too abstract for something
 like the ethical social bonds that
 Ruby Yarrowin's and my conver-
 sation seems to be demanding and
 that the lives of her children and
 grandchildren now face. To say
 to Ruby Yarrowin's progeny that
 they should celebrate being out-
 side the charmed circle of sexual
 normativity is not to say anything
 about how they exist in the world
 as it organizes and represents
 the losses that they continually
 encounter. And thus it poses no

real ethical challenge to the kinds of bonds that would be found or forged in these specific worlds. The specification of two kinds of loss and obligation on which Ruby Yarrowin's living relatives must build their social worlds will be sufficient to close this essay: what is their obligation to a specific kind of loss and foreclosure and their position in the spectacle of enjoyment?

Take, for instance, the microdeformations of this conversation. If Ruby's enjoyment was in being and inciting others to be, then can those of us living in the world here and now be in her enjoyment? If we are imagining the world she is inviting us to join as the world in which she grew up, then the answer is clearly no. No one can be in that world of handkerchiefs and *bargarwi*. We cannot even ask Ruby Yarrowin to clarify what she meant by handkerchiefs and *bargarwi*. She was the only one who could tell me because she was the last person for whom Emiyenggal was a spoken way of life. But even if I had asked, then, exhausted but going on—or if her children who were still quite young at the time had asked—none of our bodies and their histories of care were of the same corporeality, though they suffered from similar carnal conditions.²⁰ Indeed, Ruby's inhabitation of Emiyenggal seemed to teeter on the precipice of what the language philosopher V. N. Volosinov called the radically monological—a mode of address in which there can be no response, no stylistic life, no generation.²¹ Indeed, he might have seen Ruby Yarrowin and I as swimming down the River Styx, a zone between the living and dead in which language is not addressed or responded to but simply enjoyed. Thus while there was something in excess of pleasure in these conversations—an enjoyment in being and an incitement to be beyond the grammatical enclosures of meaning, a thing whose existence is so incredible that one incessantly questions its reality—the thing always threatened to enclose and envelope Ruby Yarrowin herself.²² How could Ruby have existed in the world as it was commonly organized? How could we exist together in such a way that we could share a sphere of enjoyment without a common world? Ruby Yarrowin and I were not merely enjoying the excess of the law. If enjoyment is the encounter with the impossible thing, then, in some crucial way Ruby Yarrowin was the thing of enjoyment—the impossible existence in the world as it is now organized. She is the part that can have no part in the common world—the thing that cannot be yet is, concretely, before us. And she marked this thing in referring to the undecidable desire between being the story and herself, the potentiality, the affect, that exceeds the realm of representation even as it is conditioned by this realm.

As a result, when her children and grandchildren seek to use her words as the basis of a new form of knowledge, they face obligating themselves to a dual form of foreclosure. On the one hand, they are obligating themselves to a common

1 world they cannot enter even as they find themselves obliged to feel this problem,
2 this possibility and closure, and it allowed them to remain with her in the world as
3 it is currently organized even if in the negative formation. On the other hand, they
4 are obligating themselves to a set of ethical substances and exercises of care that
5 have been stained by sexuality. Indeed, the problem Ruby's children and grand-
6 children face when sitting down to consider their augmented reality project in the
7 context of the intervention is that these exercises of care may produce the opposite
8 of care. They may create the opportunity for various state agencies and publics
9 to withhold care as a mode of care. Since the intervention, sexuality has become
10 a general *stain* on Indigenous culture in the sense of a smear and defecation of
11 cultural pleasure—and thus every enjoyment of Indigenous culture is enjoyment
12 as *jouissance*. What Ruby Yarrowin's progeny seek is not to be sexualized or be
13 spiritualized, not to be the perverse or sanctified other to settler culture, but rather
14 not to have this as their choice.

15 And finally, these obligations must be practiced—exercised as *askesis*—
16 in a world organized in such a way that the practitioners are simultaneously the
17 corpse hanging from the gallows for others to take enjoyment from and those who
18 are looking at themselves on the gallows deciding whether to refuse its disci-
19 plines. Not only do Indigenous men and women die at a much earlier age than
20 non-Indigenous people, their health deteriorates more rapidly. In the foreground of
21 Indigenous lifeworlds is the question, “How long will you last?” How long before I
22 will be cut to the quick because you've left, too; left us behind once again. Indeed,
23 by the time Ruby died in 2007, five of her eight children had died at the aver-
24 age age of thirty-five, one from childhood pneumonia, one of septicemia, one of
25 tuberculosis, one of cancer, one hit by a car in Darwin. And so Ruby and I were
26 not talking about olden time stories but the carnality of the corporeal regime of
27 late liberalism within the grammatical play of Emiyenggal. That wouldn't seem to
28 have anything to do with sexuality, though it might have to do with friendship and
29 affect. On the other hand, even the experience of this life cycle forecloses rather
30 than opens a common sociability. This fracturing of sociability was once again
31 made clear to me when another old friend and colleague was dying of throat can-
32 cer in 2005. In the last six months of her life, she was given a song in a dream. In
33 her dream a deceased nephew of hers was sitting in the country singing the song.
34 In some songs are heard *nyuidj* languages, spirit languages, which most of my
35 Indigenous friends say are semantically impenetrable. But this song was in clear
36 Emiyenggal. One line of the song also makes use of the verb class, things done in
37 a slicing motion (*ngala-neparr nunggu-yi*: “I am passing around [the tamarinds]”).
38 But here the song refers to the passing around of tamarinds. When I hear this song

I am cut to the quick, as are many other friends of mine, because so many people who this song refers to, and gives voice to, people who are my age or younger, have left us behind, as my Indigenous friends paraphrase death. But in Emiyenggal one doesn't say, "cut to the quick." As Ruby noted above, we use another verb class, *guman-gurr*, what a kind of bird (*wagalwagal*) does to signal that someone has died—and what people do when they are in grief. It is what a *wagalwagal* did as we were digging yams in 1989, when one of Ruby's daughters died in her mid-thirties from septicemia.

Clearly, these worlds are not normative from the point of view of heteronormativity or settler normativity. But what is gained or lost by plugging the hole opened by these foreclosed worlds and actual corpses with the figure of the queer? Does this reassure us too soon, before queer theory has itself come to terms with its own situated histories, that queer social bonds can become so general that no history, no social division, no differential situation of bodies and subjects can disturb them? Does it reassure me that Ruby Yarrowin and I did meet, enjoy each other, and find a miraculous commonality in a world that would never let us meet?

Notes

1. See Slavoj Žižek, *For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor* (London: Verso, 1991), 231.
2. By autological subject and genealogical society, I mean a set of practices, dispositions, and norms that cluster around the fantasy of not only the future-oriented, self-actualizing subject but also the culturally constrained, past-looking subject of custom. See Elizabeth A. Povinelli, *The Empire of Love: Toward a Theory of Intimacy, Genealogy, and Carnality* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006).
3. Gilles Deleuze, *Nietzsche and Philosophy*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 101.
4. Gilles Deleuze, Vincennes lectures, deleuzelectures.blogspot.com/2007/02/on--spinoza.html.
5. Deleuze, Vincennes lectures.
6. The idea may have an objective (extrinsic) reality insofar as it represents a thing. It also has a formal (intrinsic) reality insofar as it is a thing independent of what it represents. See Deleuze, Vincennes lectures.
7. Charles Taylor, "The Politics of Recognition," in *Multiculturalism*, ed. Amy Gutmann (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), 64.
8. The land commissioner is charged with hearing, and various land councils with organizing, all land claims in the Northern Territory under the Aboriginal Land Rights Act.

- 1 9. Rex Wild and Patricia Anderson, *Ampe Akelyernemane Meka Mekarle: Little Children*
2 *Sacred*, Board of Inquiry into the Protection of Aboriginal Children from Sexual
3 Abuse, April 30, 2007, (Darwin, Australia: Northern Territory Government
4 Printer, 2007), 12.
- 5 10. An article in the *Australian*, “Secrets in the Shadows” published in June 2008 gives
6 a sense of the public rhetoric that emerged. The story begins dramatically with the
7 death of a teenage boy, “who dropped dead after a footy match” near Papunya in
8 central Australia. Although “nobody’s fault,” his death set off a round of vicious vio-
9 lence in “a world where payback, retribution, spearings and mob violence are ever-
10 present.” Dismissing the “moaning of critics that the intervention was a land grab and
11 not about child sexual abuse,” the article substitutes the moaning of children through
12 hearsay about rampant sex abuse and continually embeds the causes of the abuse
13 in the actual and “perverted” traditional law of elder men and kowtowing to white
14 enablers. “Community workers, terrified that the 12-year-old boy would rape again,
15 took to sleeping in the boy’s house at night. When FACS [Department of Family and
16 Community Services] finally came to take the child into care, after a delay of many
17 weeks, the boy’s family whisked the child into cultural business. Police refused to
18 transgress on ceremonial ground and FACS workers retreated” (Natasha Robinson,
19 “Secrets in the Shadow,” *The Australian Online*, June 21, 2008, [www.theaustralian
.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23896671-5006790,00.html](http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,25197,23896671-5006790,00.html)).
- 20 11. Laura Beacroft and Melanie Poole, “Overview of Northern Territory Emergency
21 Response” (2008), www.anu.edu.au/caepr/Publications/topical/Beacroft_NTER.pdf
22 (accessed November 15, 2010).
- 23 12. “Full Transcript of PM’s speech,” *The Australian Online*, February 13, 2008, [www
.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/full-transcript-of-pms-speech/story-e6fgr6nf
24 -1111115543192](http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/nation/full-transcript-of-pms-speech/story-e6fgr6nf-1111115543192) (accessed November 15, 2010).
- 25 13. Povinelli, *Empire of Love*, 198.
- 26 14. Pearson states that Sutton provides “hope that the debate on indigenous policy is
27 becoming much more forthright” and that “issues that habitually have been skirted
28 around or alluded to only in anthropological code are being discussed with a refresh-
29 ing bluntness” (Pearson, “Face Reality of Violence,” *The Australian Online*, June 13,
30 2009, www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,,25627726-5013596,00.html).
- 31 15. Peter Sutton, *The Politics of Suffering: Indigenous Australia and the End of the Lib-
32 eral Consensus* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2009), 85.
- 33 16. See Tess Lea, “The Sorry Cycle of Substandard Indigenous Housing Gets a New
34 Turn,” *Inside Story*, August 2009.
- 35 17. Povinelli, *Empire of Love*.
- 36 18. See, for instance, Gayle Rubin, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the
37 Politics of Sexuality,” in *Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Female Sexuality*, ed. Carol
38 Vance (London : Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), 267–319; George Chauncey,

- “The Postwar Sex Crime Panic,” in *True Stories from the American Past*, ed. William Graebner (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1; Caleb Crain, “Pleasure Principles: Queer Theorists and Gay Journalists Wrestle over the Politics of Sex,” *Lingua Franca*, October 1997, linguafranca.mirror.theinfo.org/9710/toc.9710.html (accessed November 17, 2010); and Michael Warner, *The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics, and the Ethics of Queer Life* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999).
19. Bruce Burgett, “Sex, Panic, Nation,” *American Literary History* 21, no. 1 (2009): 67.
21. V. N. Volosinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language*, trans. Ladislav Matejka and I. R. Titunik (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).
22. Slavoj Žižek, “The Undergrowth of Enjoyment,” in *The Žižek Reader*, ed. Elizabeth Wright and Edmond Wright (London: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999), 31.

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